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This Article analyzes key vulnerabilities in the Internet’s
infrastructure, protocols, and code, and how they may be better
managed through interventions at multiple levels. In particular,
this Article examines the concept of polycentric governance and its
applicability to technical vulnerabilities in the Internet. This
theory has been championed by proponents such as Nobel
Laureate Elinor Ostrom and promotes self-organization and
networking regulations at multiple levels to address an array of
global issues, from urban crime, to climate change and cyber
attacks. However, there has not yet been a consideration of the
applicability of this framework to technical Internet vulnerabilities
explicitly, which is a conversation this Article seeks to jumpstart.
‘The Internet was designed without any
contemplation of national boundaries. The actual
traffic in the Net is totally unbounded with respect
to geography.’ Vint[on] Cerf, who uttered those
words, should know; he helped design the computer
protocols that made the Internet possible. And yet
the ‘father of the Internet’ is only partially right.
Yes, the Internet he designed did not contemplate
national boundaries. But no . . . the Internet is not
‘unbound with respect to geography.’ Cerf’s central
mistake, a mistake typically made about the
Internet, is to believe that there was something
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necessary or unchangeable about the Net’s original
architecture.
– Harvard Professor Jack Goldsmith and Columbia Professor
Tim Wu1
The only truly secure system is one that is powered
off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a leadlined room with armed guards—and even then I
have my doubts.
– Purdue Professor Gene Spafford2
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Charlie Miller says that he can crash the Internet and take
control of some of the most protected computer systems in the
world.3 Miller, now a cybersecurity analyst at Twitter,4 was the
first person to break into Apple’s iPhone; he discovered a software
flaw that would have allowed him to take control of every iPhone
on the planet.5 He has won the prestigious Black Hat cybersecurity
competition, among numerous other awards, and worked for the
NSA for five years.6 In 2010, while presenting at a NATO
Committee of Excellence conference on cyber conflict in Tallinn,
Estonia, Miller conducted a thought experiment—if he was forced
1

JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 58 (2006).
2
QUOTABLE SPAF, http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/quotes.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2014) (citing A. K. Dewdney, Computer Recreations: Of Worms, Viruses and Core War,
260 SCI. AM., Mar. 1989, at 110, 110).
3
See Charlie Miller, Presentation at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCDCOE) Conference, in Tallinn, Est. (June 17, 2010), available at
http://ccdcoe.org/conference2010/materials/app.html.
4
See Andy Greenberg, Twitter Hires Elite Apple Hacker Charlie Miller to Beef up Its
Security Team, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2012/09/14/twitter-snags-elite-apple-hacker-charlie-miller-to-beef-up-itssecurity-team.
5
See Andy Greenberg, How to Hijack ‘Every iPhone in the World’, FORBES (July 28,
2009, 5:40 PM), http:www.forbes.com20090728hackers-iphone-apple-technologysecurity-hackers.html.
6
See Kelly J. Higgins, Apple ‘Ban’ Gives Miller Time to Hack Other Things, DARK
READING (July 10, 2012), http://www.darkreading.com/end-user/apple-ban-gives-millertime-to-hack-othe/240003490.
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to, how would he go about crashing the Internet and taking control
of protected systems?7 In the scenario that he imagined, former
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il had kidnapped and induced him
to “hack the planet”—to control as many protected systems and
Internet hosts as possible so as to dominate cyberspace. Miller
then catalogued all of the steps that would be required to meet this
audacious goal.
He would need people—roughly 600 working throughout the
world, and a way to communicate with them.8 The trick would be
identifying them—a task made easier if Miller or another expert in
the field was a willing co-conspirator with a North Korean
intelligence agency like the Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau.9
Assuming that he could gather the necessary talent, Table 3.1
describes how Miller would divide tasks among his “army.”
Table 3.1: Charlie Miller’s Hypothetical Cyber Army10
Job Title

Vulnerability
analyst

Exploit
developers

7

Brief Job
Description

Approximate
Number of
Hackers
Required
Find bugs in
20
code: need to
be
worldclass
programmers
Research and
70
exploit
vulnerabilities
across a range
of platforms

Total Cost
(in millions)
$2.9

$7.3

See Miller, supra note 3.
See id.
9
See North Korean Intelligence Agencies, FAS, https://www.fas.org/irp/world/dprk/
index.html (last visited June 12, 2013).
10
See Miller, supra note 3.
8
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Botnet
collectors

Collect hosts
(i.e., take over
millions of
computers)

60

$4.15

Botnet
maintainers

Monitor size
and health of
botnets

220

$12.9

Operators

Exploit hard
and soft
targets

60

$5.4

Remote
personnel

Set up
operations
around the
world and
access “airgapped
systems”

20

$.4

Developers

Develop
custom
software,
including bots

40

$2.85

Testers

Test exploits
for
functionality
and reliability

15

$.8

Technical
consultants

Offer
expertise in
specific
systems, like
SCADA and
medical
devices

20

$2

10

$.5

System
Keep systems
administrators running and
updated
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$6.2

Miller’s army would need funding and “weapons” like botnets,
distributed denial of service attacks, bots, and—above all—zeroday exploits, all of which are described in this Article. These
weapons would often use the Internet, but to complete his hack,
Miller would also need to compromise hard, protected targets that
are often “air gapped,” or not connected to the Internet. Highprofile attacks like Stuxnet, the exfiltrated documents published by
WikiLeaks, and the 2008 breach of classified U.S. government
systems are examples of these types of attacks.11 Attackers look
for entry points that are poorly defended with the goal of using one
host to infect others on the closed network.12 This could be
accomplished by low-tech means, such as through a simple flash
drive.13
Lastly, Miller would need time. For the first three months, his
cyber army would search for vulnerabilities. From three to nine
months, zero-day exploits would be identified and used to take
over routers. After one year, some hard, protected targets would
be compromised. At eighteen months, sufficient zero-day exploits
would be found and air-gapped systems compromised to begin
final planning. Finally, after two years, the attack could start
manifesting itself assuming that no law enforcement agency or
other group identified the attackers in the meantime, which is a
rather large assumption.

11

See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, For Recent Cyberattacks, Motivations Vary, NPR (June 16,
2011, 12:01 AM), http:www.npr.org20110616137210246for-recent-cyberattacksmotivations-vary (reporting on a subset of cyber attacks and discussing the varying
motivations of attackers); Protecting SCADA Systems with Air Gaps Is a Myth, INFOSEC
ISLAND (May 21, 2012), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21388-ProtectingSCADA-Systems-with-Air-Gaps-is-a-Myth.html (discussing air gapping).
12
See Miller, supra note 3.
13
See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Don’t Stick It in: The Dangers of USB Drives, SLATE
(Oct. 5, 2010), http:www.slate.comarticlestechnologytechnology201010dont_stick_
it_in.html.
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The bottom line, according to Miller, is that the Internet and
even air-gapped computer systems may be controlled or crashed
for roughly $50 million, which is reportedly less than what North
Korea spends on cybersecurity annually.14 Richard Clarke, former
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counter-terrorism for the United States, among others, has warned
that North Korea will not shy away from using its cyber warfare
capabilities in a conflict.15 This danger is posed by other isolated
regimes as well, and there is “anecdotal evidence that unknown
parties have explored the possibility of disrupting the global
network.”16 Sound ripe for a spy thriller? What is good for genrewriting enthusiasts is rarely an ideal starting point for
policymakers. According to some commentators, such narratives
merely serve to inflate fears and undermine constructive efforts to
enhance cybersecurity,17 and it is true that such a scenario is highly
unlikely. But there is some value to be extracted from this tale.
The vulnerabilities that Miller points to are real and require our
attention if we are to ensure that fiction does not become reality.
However, contemporary approaches have not been successful in
mitigating the cyber threat, raising the need to consider novel
governance structures.
This Article fills in the background to Miller’s narrative by
analyzing the key vulnerabilities in the Internet’s infrastructure,
protocols, and code, and how they may be better managed through
interventions at multiple scales. In particular, this Article
examines the concept of polycentric governance and its
applicability to technical vulnerabilities in the Internet. This multi14

Miller, supra note 3; see also SEC’Y OF DEF., MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 9 (2012) (an
annual report to Congress discussing North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities).
15
See Andy Greenberg, Security Guru Richard Clarke Talks Cyberwar, FORBES (Apr.
8, 2010, 11:45 AM), http:www.forbes.com20100408cyberwar-obama-koreatechnology-security-clarke.html.
16
James A. Lewis, The “Korean” Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber
Conflict, CSIS 6 n.7 (Oct. 2009), http://csis.org/files/publication/091023_Korean_Cyber_
Attacks_and_Their_Implications_for_Cyber_Conflict.pdf.
17
See, e.g., Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (reporting on the unlikelihood of a cyber
apocalypse) [hereinafter Cyberwar].
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level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral model,18
championed by scholars including Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom
and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges orthodoxy by
demonstrating the benefits of self-organization, networking
regulations at multiple levels, and the extent to which national and
private control can coexist with communal management.19 The
“basic idea” of polycentric governance is that a group facing a
collective action problem “should be able to address it” in
“whatever way they [members of the group] best see fit.”20 This
could include using existing governance structures or crafting new
systems.21 This partially bottom-up form of governance is
consistent with approaches taken by such technical communities as
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),22 and so may have
some applicability to addressing outstanding vulnerabilities that
have so far avoided amelioration.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I investigates how it
is possible to regulate through architecture to enhance
cybersecurity, building from the work of Professors Lawrence
Lessig and Andrew Murray, as well as other regulatory theorists.23
18

See Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163 (Feb. 2011)
(defining “polycentricity” as “a system of governance in which authorities from
overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions
under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units,
are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public
purposes”).
19
See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving CollectiveAction Problems 2 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis,
Working Paper Series No. 08–6, 2008).
20
Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1 (The Vincent and Elinor
Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Working
Paper No. W11-3, 2011) (prepared for presentation at the Conference on SelfGovernance, Polycentricity, and Development, Renmin Univsity, in Beijing, China),
available at http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/Beijing_core.pdf.
21
Id. at 1–2.
22
See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyber Peace: Managing Cyber Attacks
Through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, (2013) (exploring the
applicability of polycentric governance to Internet governance debates).
23
See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE
ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 43 (2006).
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Part II then explores the Internet’s systemic vulnerabilities along
with how cyber attackers are exploiting them, using case studies
such as GhostNet. Finally, in Part III, we address the extent to
which cybersecurity may be improved through a polycentric
approach to addressing technical vulnerabilities.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO REGULATING CYBERSPACE THROUGH
POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE
Technology is a critical component of managing vulnerabilities
in the cyber regulatory environment,24 but implementing fixes and
enhancing cybersecurity requires an understanding of the multiple
layers that comprise cyberspace. Sir Tim Berners-Lee analyzes
four distinct layers of Internet architecture; the transmission,
computer, software, and content layers.25 Critically, each layer
“only uses functions from the layer below, and only exports
functionality to the layer above.”26 This means that mitigation
strategies are most efficiently introduced from the bottom-up,
leading to both opportunities and challenges for regulators and
illustrating the potential for polycentric governance in this context
that is especially relevant at a time of Congressional impasse over
how best to enhance cybersecurity.27
To help translate these insights into a regulatory framework for
policymakers, Professor Yochai Benkler has introduced a
simplified three-layer structure composed of: (1) the “physical
infrastructure,” including the fiber optic cables and routers making
up the physical aspect of cyberspace; (2) the “logical
infrastructure,” comprising necessary “software such as the TCP/IP
protocol;” and (3) the “content layer,” which includes data and,
24

See id.
See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 129–30 (2000).
26
MURRAY, supra note 23, at 43.
27
See id. at 44–45; see, e.g., Nelson Peacock, Cybersecurity Could Be the Next
Bipartisan Breakthrough, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/196026-cybersecurity-could-be-the-next-bipartisan-breakthrough
(discussing the potential of a cybersecurity bill passing Congress in 2014); Alan Charles
Raul, Break the Impasse on Cybersecurity, THE HILL, (June 12, 2012, 12:05 AM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/232147-break-the-impasse-on-cybersecurity.
25
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indirectly, users.28 This model has also been adopted with some
modifications by Professor Lessig to help explain how code
regulates content and becomes law,29 and to advocate for
protecting openness so as to incentivize “decentralized innovation”
through codifying such architecture in the supporting layers.30
However, Professor Murray has argued that such an approach is
“idealistic” and could create conflict, observing that, “the
harnessing of one regulatory modality through the application of
another is more likely to lead to further regulatory competition,
due to the complexity of the network environment.”31 Instead of
solely relying on code, then, laws, norms, and markets also have
important roles to play in shaping the polycentric regulatory
environment.32 Because of its emphasis on targeted measures,
self-organization, and collaborative bottom-up governance,
polycentric governance may provide an avenue to better
understand this regulatory complexity and how it can be harnessed
to mitigate conflict and enhance cybersecurity.
Scholars from various disciplines have developed the concept
of polycentricity, but for the immediate purposes polycentric
governance may be considered a regulatory system “characterized
by multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a
monocentric unit,” according to Professor Ostrom.33 Unlike in
traditional conceptions of governance, then, in which the State
plays a central role, the State is not the only source of rulemaking
in a polycentric system and, in fact, may play little or no role at
28

MURRAY, supra note 23, at 44–45 (citing Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and
User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000)).
29
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 160 (2004) (describing
“the interaction between architecture and law . . . .”).
30
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 85 (2002); MURRAY, supra note 23, at 46.
31
MURRAY, supra note 23, at 46 (“It is highly unlikely that content producers, media
corporations and other copyright holders will allow for a neutral system designed to
protect cultural property and creativity at the cost of loss of control over their products.”).
32
See id. at 46–47, 124.
33
Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010).
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all.34 Rather, an array of interdependent public and private-sector
stakeholders interact, each adding some value to the overall
regime.35 There is an opportunity within such a system for
“mutual monitoring, learning, and adaptation of better strategies
over time.”36
Perhaps no one has done more to advance the study of
polycentric governance than Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom,
Vincent Ostrom, and their colleagues at the Vincent and Elinor
Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at
Indiana University.37 Beginning in the 1970s, their work in this
space challenged prevailing notions regarding the benefits of
consolidating public services, like police and education.38 Through
a series of studies, they demonstrated, for example, that small- and
medium-sized police departments outperformed their larger
counterparts.39 Though much of this early work arose in the
context of small-scale common pool resources, toward the end of
her career Professor Ostrom and others began arguing for the
adoption of polycentric solutions to collective action problems
stemming from global common pool resources; such work
arguably has some application to the Internet. Yet in order to
conceptualize such a dynamic environment operating at multiple
scales, it is first necessary to analyze the Internet’s architecture and
34

See Julie Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 137–38 (2008).
35
See Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, & Robert Warren, The Organization of
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831,
831–32 (1961).
36
Ostrom, supra note 33, at 552.
37
See VINCENT & ELINOR OSTROM WORKSHOP IN POL. THEORY & POL’Y ANALYSIS,
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop (last visited June 1, 2013).
38
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN POLICING (1978)
(reporting on a major study of police organization in 80 metropolitan areas); Eric A.
Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24
J. ECON. LIT. 1141 (1986) (finding no better performance in larger school districts); Paul
Teske et al., Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information,
Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 702
(1993).
39
See generally POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Michael D. McGinnis, ed.
1999) (collecting these studies).
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efforts to make it more secure at all levels, which is a task we turn
to in Part II.
II. MITIGATING VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
AND CODE TO ENHANCE CYBERSECURITY FROM THE BOTTOM UP
This Part builds from the conceptual framework introduced in
Part I to discuss how polycentric governance may be applied to
analyze a range of technical Internet vulnerabilities from the
bottom up. This investigation thus begins with hardware, before
moving on to assess vulnerabilities in the logical infrastructure,
code, and user best practices focusing on mitigating social
engineering attacks.
A. Securing the Internet’s Physical Infrastructure
At its most basic level, the Internet is composed of a series of
cables, computers, and routers.40 Innocent or malicious hardware
flaws in this physical infrastructure can give rise to myriad
vulnerabilities. As Clarke and Robert Knake explain, “[w]hat can
be done to millions of lines of code can also be done with millions
of circuits imprinted on computer chips inside computers, routers,
and servers.”41 Circuits leave physical trapdoors, but as with code,
most experts cannot easily identify flaws in a computer chip.42
Indeed, producing a microchip requires some 400 steps.43 Aside
from manufacturing or design defects, some bugs may be
purposefully implanted. A 2012 Microsoft report found malware
being installed in PCs at factories in China, highlighting the
insecurity of production lines.44 U.S. government reports have also
cited supply chain concerns for hardware, finding components
40

See MURRAY, supra note 23, at 44.
RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 95 (2010).
42
See id.
43
See Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing the Information Highway, FOREIGN
AFF. (Nov. 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65499/wesley-k-clark-andpeter-l-levin/securing-the-information-highway.
44
See Malware Inserted on PC Production Lines, Says Study, BBC (Sept. 13, 2012,
10:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19585433.
41
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embedded with security flaws.45 In a worst-case scenario, kill
switches could be installed in Pentagon networks to power down
critical systems by remote control as a prelude to an attack. Yet
revelations from Edward Snowden have revealed that the NSA has
also been intercepting computer shipments to install backdoors in
hardware and even spy on Microsoft’s internal communications
system.46
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) program was intended to help drive down costs for
proven technologies by using state-of-the-art commercial systems
in lieu of the cost-plus-award-fee method that covered contractors’
costs and paid them a profit.47 The advantages of COTS are selfevident, but with a COTS item—such as Dell computer hardware,
which is widely used by the Department of Defense—the
government cannot monitor the manufacturing process.48 Thus,
the true cost of COTS lies in the vulnerabilities that it introduces
into critical national infrastructure.49 Grasping how to best contain
the issue of hardware flaws is difficult because the supply chain
involves many companies operating in many countries. According
to some experts like Clarke, buying hardware that has been
manufactured abroad leaves U.S. systems vulnerable to attacks.50
45

See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 95; Aliya Sternstein, Threat of Destructive
Coding on Foreign-Manufactured Technology Is Real, NEXTGOV (July 7, 2011),
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2011/07/threat-of-destructive-coding-on-foreignmanufactured-technology-is-real/49363.
46
See, e.g., Raphael Satter, Report: NSA Intercepts Computer Deliveries, AP (Dec. 29,
2013), http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_NSA_SURVEILLANCE?SITE=AP&
SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
47
See, e.g., Press Release, Frost & Sullivan, U.S. Department of Defense to
Increasingly Rely on Commercial Off-the-Shelf Aircraft (June 6, 2013), available at
http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/press-release.pag?docid=279378546 (reporting on
spending increases on the DOD’s COTS aircraft purchase program).
48
See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 86 (discussing the production process of a
Dell laptop).
49
See also Elizabeth Montalbano, DOD Approves Dell Android Tablet for Use, INFO.
WK. (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/
mobile/dod-approves-dell-android-tablet-for-use/231901988 (reporting on an example of
DOD purchases of Dell products).
50
See Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Hardware Imported from China Could Leave U.S.
Open to Cyber-Threats, ZDNET (Mar. 30, 2012, 6:13 GMT), http:www.zdnet.com
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However, there are not enough U.S. manufacturers to allow the
Pentagon to buy domestically, as shown by the DOD’s purchase of
2,200 Sony PlayStation 3s in 2009 to provide processing power for
a military supercomputer.51 These systems are often manufactured
abroad in nations including China that have track records of supply
chain insecurity.52 Once compromised, hardware is often in the
hands of an unknowing user. Few hardware vulnerabilities are
likely to be discovered and fixed—and even fewer are likely to be
attributed to a particular cyber attacker.
More can be done to secure the Internet’s physical
infrastructure. New add-on security features are needed to
safeguard systems,53 as are quality control and, in the U.S. context,
more domestic sources of key components. The DOD, for
example, could revise COTS and make a long-standing
commitment to U.S. firms to purchase critical components
domestically. This would have the dual benefits of being both a
boon to the U.S. electronics industry by creating good U.S. jobs as
well as promoting cybersecurity. Though not a perfect solution
since domestically produced hardware may still be vulnerable to
insider attacks,54 and such protectionism would need to be
targeted, transparent, and justifiable to assuage concerns over
bloghardwarehardware-imported-from-china-could-leave-us-open-to-cyberthreats19400.
51
See Military Purchases 2,200 PS3s, CNN (Dec. 9, 2009, 11:14 AM),
http:scitech.blogs.cnn.com200912 09military-purchases-2200-ps3s.
52
See WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 34 (2009) [hereinafter
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW] (noting that “the emergence of new centers for
manufacturing, design, and research across the globe raises concerns about the potential
for easier subversion of computers and networks through subtle hardware or software
manipulations”); Sony to Manufacture PS3 in China to Ensure Supply (SNE), SEEKING
ALPHA (May 16, 2006, 11:00 AM) http:seekingalpha.comarticle10729-sony-tomanufacture-ps3-in-china-to-ensure-supply-sne.
53
See COMM. NAT’L SEC. SYS., NATIONAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) GLOSSARY 2
(Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/CNSSI_
4009.pdf.
54
See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 52, at 34 (“Foreign manufacturing
does present easier opportunities for nation-state adversaries to subvert products;
however, the same goals could be achieved through the recruitment of key insiders or
other espionage activities.”).
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touching off a trade war,55 it would be an improvement on the
status quo. Securing the physical layer, though, is merely the first
step toward enhancing cybersecurity and ultimately fostering cyber
peace.
B. Managing Vulnerabilities in the Logical Infrastructure
Security has not scaled along with the expanding Internet.
Early networks such as ARPANET, used by a relatively small
population of engineers and academics, had little need for built-in
security. Cybersecurity concerns grew as the Internet evolved, but
technologies that brought interoperability and efficiency were
favored over better security, which could slow systems down or
make them incompatible. As a result, many potential measures
that could enhance cybersecurity became mired in debate.56 In
particular, there are four protocols that represent key aspects of the
Internet’s architecture and present significant vulnerabilities in the
logical infrastructure: the Transport Control Protocol (TCP), the
Internet Protocol (IP), the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol,
and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). TCP/IP is the set of
protocols that Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf designed, easing
interconnection and laying the groundwork for the Internet.57 DNS
is the Internet’s address system, designed by Postel and others, that
works as a phone book to map domain names to IP addresses.
BGP tells routers how and where to send information and is the
protocol that enables distributed routing. Each of these protocols
and their vulnerabilities are addressed in turn, along with efforts to
make them more secure within a polycentric framework.
1. TCP/IP
Together, TCP and IP describe how the Internet transmits
packets of data from one place to another by addressing,
55

See id.; Allan A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Trade: National Policies, Global and
Local Consequences, BROOKINGS INST., 4–5 (2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/papers/2013/09/19%20cybersecurity%20and%20trade%20global%2
0local%20friedman/brookingscybersecuritynew.pdf.
56
See ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN AN
AGE OF CYBER INSECURITY vii (2010).
57
See MURRAY, supra note 23, at 67–68.
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fragmenting, and reassembling packets between two reliable
hosts58—not completely unlike the transporters on Star Trek. IP,
however, is an unreliable, “best effort” protocol, meaning that
packets are not inherently secure.59 There is no easy way to verify
who sent an IP packet, determine whether it has been modified, or
even if anyone has viewed it en route. It is the job of TCP to add
reliability by monitoring the delivery of IP packets.60 As the layer
of the Internet Protocol Suite situated between the Internet layer
and the applications layer, TCP acts as a go-between. It turns
fragmented data into a coherent stream. Many applications, like
the web and e-mail, use TCP because of its reliability.
Although TCP provides some protection against packets going
astray, it was never intended to provide security against a
malicious adversary modifying or inserting packets into
communications between two parties.61 For example, before data
can be transferred between two hosts, TCP must first establish a
connection between them through a process that is often referred to
as a “three-way handshake,” akin to the exchange of “hellos” to
start a telephone conversation.62 These “hello” messages in
technical parlance are called SYN messages, or synchronized
packets. A malicious attacker posing as a client can use a “SYN
flood” by falsifying or omitting information to make a server never
complete its part of the handshake.63 It is like tying up a
switchboard with incoming callers who refuse to hang up.

58

See generally INFO. SCIS. INST., S. CAL., INTERNET PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET
PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION (Jon Postel ed., 1981), available at
http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc791.
59
See id.; see also TCP/IP Core Protocols, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc958827.aspx (last visited June 12, 2013).
60
INFO. SCIS. INST., S. CAL., TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET
PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION, RFC 793 (Jon Postel ed., 1981), available at
http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc793.
61
See Security Threats, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/enus/library/cc723507.aspx (last visited June 12, 2013) [hereinafter Security Threats]
(providing an overview of cybersecurity threats including those targeting TCP).
62
See Randall Stewart & Chris Metz, SCTP: New Transport Protocol for TCPIP, 5(6)
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 64, 67 (2001).
63
See id.; Wesley Eddy, TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations, IETF
RFC 4987 (2007), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc4987. For further discussion
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As with IP, TCP was recognized by the mid-1990s as
insecure.64 Extra security was introduced into the three-way
handshake, such as the IETF randomizing certain information to
guard against sequence number spoofing.65 Although this limited
attacks against TCP, it has not eliminated all vulnerabilities. In
part, TCP remains vulnerable because IP is vulnerable—by
hijacking IP packets, an attacker can eavesdrop on a TCP session,
record the sequence of numbers being used, and forge a set of false
IP packets that trick TCP.66 This allows for spying, a starting point
for cyber-espionage and crime.
2. DNS
In August 2013, the New York Times online operations, along
with an array of other organizations such as Twitter, were hacked,
allegedly by the Syrian Electronic Army.67 These and other sites
have been compromised as a result of insecurities in the DNS,
allowing attackers to, for example, “limit access” to the New York
Times website “for nearly 48 hours.”68 In this case, attackers
hacked into an Australian domain name registry and managed to
alter stored information there, allowing them to redirect users to a
webpage sporting whatever information the Syrian Electronic
Army wished to post.69
Unfortunately, such attacks are far from the exception since,
like IP and TCP, DNS was recognized as being insecure in the
of the types of SYN Floods, see Hossein Falaki et al., A First Look at Traffic on
Smartphones, IMC INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE PROC. 281, 285 (2010).
64
See Chris Chambers, Justin Dolske & Jayaraman Iyer, TCPIP Security, DEP’T
COMP. SCI. OHIO ST. U., http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource_files/documentation/
tcpip-security.html (last visited June 12, 2013).
65
See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, DEFENDING AGAINST SEQUENCE NUMBER ATTACKS, IETF
RFC 1948 (1996), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc1948.
66
See Security Threats, supra note 61.
67
See Hayley Tsukayama & Timothy B. Lee, How the Syrian Electronic Army and
Other Hacker Groups Are Attacking News Web Sites, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-syrian-electronic-army-andother-hacker-groups-are-attacking-news-web-sites/2013/08/28/bda8f464-1032-11e38cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200.
68
See id.
69
See id.
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mid-1990s, but fixes stalled.70 Then, in 2008, hacker Dan
Kaminsky found a bug that demonstrated the full extent of the
DNS Protocol’s vulnerability,71 in essence demonstrating the
concept years before the Syrian Electronic Army’s attacks. Thus,
the process of matching a domain name to its correct IP address—
the main job of the DNS protocol—was unreliable and insecure.72
This is because the DNS, like many other protocols, was designed
to work despite accidental failures, not malicious attacks.
According to Von Welch, deputy director of the Indiana University
Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, “[w]hat we’ve been
seeing is the slow hardening of the protocols to try and turn their
failure protections into attack protections.”73
To take advantage of Kaminsky’s bug, an attacker would likely
plant fake web pages that are extensions of the same domain.
Then, when users click on links with the same authority record,
their browsers would ask a resolver which web page to display by
using different codes. If an attacker constantly sends answers to all
of the users’ resolvers with the help of a bot, he or she will
eventually guess the right code. The recursive DNS server will
then think that the response was from an authoritative DNS server,
and the response will be accepted. Because the wrong answer will
be stored in that resolver’s cache, everyone using the poisoned ISP
is at risk until the specified time expires. In 2009, a Brazilian bank
reported that its ISP was poisoned and “that some of its customers
were redirected to websites” that were designed “to steal their
passwords[.]”74 Linux Journal blogger Cory Wright wrote of
Kaminsky’s bug: “Yes, the exploit is real, and it is severe.” He

70

See Chambers, supra note 64.
See, e.g., Cory Wright, Understanding Kaminsky’s DNS Bug, LINUX J. (July 25,
2008), http:www.linuxjournal.comcontentunderstanding-kaminskys-dns-bug (detailing
the Kaminsky bug).
72
See id.
73
Electronic Interview with Von Welch, Deputy Director, Indiana University Center
for Applied Cybersecurity Research (Sept. 23, 2011).
74
See Bill Snyder, What You Missed: A Major Internet Security Hole Was Finally
Plugged, INFOWORLD (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.infoworld.com/t/authentication-andauthorization/what-you-missed-major-internet-security-hole-was-finally-plugged-896.
71
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also suggested it “may be the biggest DNS security issue in the
history of the Internet . . . .”75
3. BGP
The Border Gateway Protocol is the core routing protocol of all
of the networks that comprise the Internet.76 Like the other
protocols discussed in this section, it is charged with a fundamental
task—telling information how to move. When an e-mail, for
example, is sent from one network to another, it passes through
routers. When a router receives an IP packet, BGP uses an
algorithm to make decisions about where to route it next.77 BGP
keeps routers up-to-date with information they need to receive and
correctly transmit traffic.78 As such, it is important that the
information BGP provides is accurate and reliable. However, like
IP, BGP offers insufficient ways to confirm accuracy. Rather, sets
of routers under a single administration, which are known as
“autonomous systems,” trade data that is taken at face value
enabling fast and scaled growth but less control.79 There were
more than 25,000 registered autonomous systems comprising the
Internet as of 2007,80 but BGP does not have an authentication
mechanism to ensure that updates really are from where they
purport to be.81 It does not have anything equivalent to a recursive
DNS server’s code to double-check. BGP simply trusts the
updates, which has earned it the euphemism “routing by rumor.”82
75

Wright, supra note 71.
See Y. Rekhter et al., A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), IETF RFC 4271,
(2006), available at http:www.ietf.orgrfcrfc4271.
77
RICK KUHN, KOTIKALAPUDI SRIRAM & DOUG MONTGOMERY, NAT’L INST.
STANDARDS & TECH., BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL SECURITY 1-1, 2-3-1 (2007),
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-54/SP800-54.pdf.
78
See id. at 2-1.
79
See Fariba Khan & Carl A. Gunter, Tiered Incentives for Integrity Based Queuing,
2010 PROC. WORKSHOP ECON. NETWORKS, SYSTEMS, & COMPUTATION 1, 1 (2010),
available at http://netecon.seas.harvard.edu/NetEcon10/Papers/Khan10.pdf.
80
See id. at 6.
81
See KUHN, SRIRAM & MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, at 3–1.
82
JAMES MACFARLANE, NETWORK ROUTING BASICS: UNDERSTANDING IP ROUTING IN
CISCO SYSTEMS 109 (2006); H. Shokrzadeh et al., Improving Directional Rumor Routing
in Wireless Sensor Networks, IEEE INT’L CONF. 1, 1 (2007). There are six types or
principles of security that enable users to have increasing “trust” in their hardware and
76
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More and more, however, this trust is being broken as “Internet
disruptions due to corrupt or improperly formatted or assigned
BGP announcements are becoming more prevalent.”83 In 2004,
thousands of U.S. networks “were misdirected to Turkey;” in 2005,
“AT&T, XO and Bell South networks were misdirected to
Bolivia;” and in 2007, “Yahoo was unreachable for an hour due to
a routing problem.”84 Some of these incidents may have been
accidental, but likely not all. For example, in 2008, Pakistan
Telecom purportedly “hijacked all traffic aimed at YouTube[,]”
taking the website offline for several hours.85 In 2010, a Chinese
state-controlled telecommunications company commandeered
fifteen percent of the Internet’s routers, intercepting data from the
U.S. military for eighteen minutes without anyone seeming to
notice the service disruption.86 Dmitri Alperovitch, vice president
of threat research at the anti-virus firm McAfee, said that the
incident represented “one of the biggest—if not the biggest
hijacks—we have ever seen” while noting that “it could happen
again, anywhere and anytime.”87

software, including: confidentiality, integrity, availability, consistency, control, and audit.
See SIMSON GARFINKEL ET AL., PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SEC. 33–35 (3d ed. 2003)
(noting that often, security professionals “use the word trust to describe their level of
confidence that a computer system will behave as expected”). Confidentiality, like
privacy, means “[p]rotecting information from being read or copied by anyone who has
not been authorized by the owner of that information,” whereas integrity signifies
protecting information from being altered or deleted without authorization. Id. at 33.
Availability involves protecting services from being degraded. Id. Consistency signifies
ensuring that a system behaves as expected, control involves “[r]egulating access,” and
audit means system owners have “record[s] of activity” that allow them to trace mistakes
or malicious acts. Id. at 33–34. Vulnerabilities lie in these principles’ non-achievement,
stemming from problems with Internet Protocols to flaws in code and the bad practices of
users.
83
Derek Gabbard, Do Recent BGP Anomalies Shed a Light on What’s to Come?, SEC.
WK. (Sept. 29, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comdo-recent-bgp-anomalies-shed-lightwhats-come.
84
Ram Mohan, Routing on the Internet: A Disaster Waiting to Happen?, SEC. WK.
(Dec. 1, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comrouting-internet-disaster-waiting-happen.
85
See id.
86
See Stew Magnuson, Cyber Experts Have Proof That China Has Hijacked U.S.based Internet Traffic, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.
nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=249.
87
Id.
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“BGP eavesdropping” is a threat that “has long been
considered a theoretical weakness” by intelligence agencies such
as the NSA, which has reportedly been given private
demonstrations of the capability.88 Besides disruptive hijacking
and imperceptible eavesdropping, however, the BGP vulnerability
also enables many other exploits, including “network
overloading,” which reduces the bandwidth available for other
traffic, “black holes,” which involves sending traffic to routers that
“drop some or all” IP packets, and “looping,” wherein IP packets
“enter a looping path” and are never delivered but use up
bandwidth.89 In short, the BGP is the most scalable of all routing
protocols, but it is also at the “greatest risk of being the target of
attacks designed to disrupt or degrade service on a large scale.”90
The question then becomes, how can we better manage this and
other protocol vulnerabilities within a polycentric framework?
C. Protocol Fixes
Efforts aimed at securing vulnerabilities in IP, TCP, DNS, and
BGP are ongoing, as are debates about the Internet’s design and
how security might be enhanced. One major issue is over where
defenses should be focused—throughout the system or at the
“endpoints” (that is, applications closest to the user). Some think
that IP, TCP, DNS, and BGP need to be significantly altered so
that security is brought in at a fundamental level.91 Others,
however, think that this kind of security would change the nature
of the Internet too much by undermining anonymity or be
impossible to achieve, preferring instead that security be built into
applications like the web or e-mail.92 Currently, efforts in both
88

See Kim Zetter, Revealed: The Internet’s Biggest Security Hole, WIRED, Aug. 26,
2008, http:www.wired.comthreatlevel200808revealed-the-in.
89
See KUHN, SRIRAM, & MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, at 3–2.
90
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 30
(2003).
91
See, e.g., Tyson Macaulay, Upstream Intelligence: A New Layer of Cybersecurity,
13 IA NEWSLETTER 22, 23 (2010) (Def. Technical Info. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Def.)
(discussing a layered cybersecurity approach designed to better manage protocol
vulnerabilities).
92
See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Cybersecurity and Authentication: The
Marketplace Role in Rethinking Anonymity—Before Regulators Intervene, 20
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veins are being undertaken. For example, IETF editors have
written Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), which intends to
improve integrity, confidentiality, and control by providing
“interoperable, high quality, cryptographically-based” security at
the IP layer.93 IPsec is available for IPv4 and was originally made
mandatory by the IETF on all standards-compliant IPv6 networks,
but its “actual use . . . is optional.”94 For DNS, a Domain Name
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol, which was proposed by
IETF in 1997 and revised in 2005, has been receiving attention
since Kaminsky’s 2008 bug.95 Nevertheless, implementation has
been haphazard, and skepticism remains about whether these
solutions actually resolve security problems.
1. IPsec
Despite IPsec’s deployment on all major operating systems, it
is still not widely used.96 Why? Part of the problem lies in market
reluctance to bear the cost of enhancing security such as by
encrypting traffic. Moreover, IPv6 has not been universally
deployed as of 2013 and IPsec is only an optional extension on
IPv497—it is still “not the first choice for many security needs.”98
Instead, application-level solutions such as Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure Shell (SSH)
are sometimes favored as they are easier to deploy.99 Instead of
changing how IP-addressed packets will act on the Internet,
KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 97, 97–98 (2007) (“Over the coming tumultuous period of
dealing with online threats, policymakers should allow the experimentation necessary to
cope with today’s lack of online authentication to proceed with minimal interference.”).
93
S. Kent & K. Seo, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, IETF RFC 4301
(2005), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc4301.
94
IPv6 Security Brief, CISCO, 1 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/
iosswrel/ps6537/ps6553/white_paper_c11-678658.pdf; see Kent & Seo, supra note 93.
95
See D. Eastlake, Domain Name System Security Extensions, IETF RFC 2535 (1999),
available at http:www.ietf.orgrfcrfc2535.
96
See Electronic Interview with Yaron Sheffer, Chief Technology Officer, Porticor
Cloud Security (Jan. 23, 2011).
97
See J. Loughney, IPV6 Node Requirements, IETF RFC 4294 (2006), available at
http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc4294.
98
Sheffer, supra note 96.
99
See B. Briscoe, Tunneling of Explicit Congestion Notification, IETF RFC 6040
(2010), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc6040.
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SSL/TLS and SSH create secure channels of communication that
act like private networks built on top of the Internet.100 SSH, for
example, forms a secure shell around data transferred between two
particular IP addresses across the open Internet.101 Remote users
and servers are identified at each end of the shell, allowing
encrypted messages to be sent and received.102 Similarly,
SSL/TLS uses identification, authentication, and encryption to
engender confidentiality and control, enabling it to transmit private
information between particular IP addresses on top of the open
Internet.103 To do so, SSL/TLS identifies and “authenticates
clients” and servers and then encrypts messages sent between
them, such as to create a secure Virtual Private Network (VPN).104
Because it can protect messages sent between websites and their
own servers, SSL/TLS is also often associated with more secure
web browsing, or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
rather than Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).105 By providing
clients with a trustworthy channel by which to communicate,
SSL/TLS enables consumers to shop, bank, and otherwise take
risks online, although even this technology has been compromised;
in 2011, for example, hackers stole credentials, allowing them to
spy on 300,000 Google mail accounts.106
HTTPS also presents certain security problems that help
illustrate the drawbacks of SSL/TLS, including the fact that
SSL/TLS certificate authorities, which are third parties that
companies and website owners use to implement encryption, are

100

See Mark Hachman, IPv4 to IPv6 IP Address Transition Becoming Critical, PC
MAG., (Oct. 18, 2010, 3:18 PM), http:www.pcmag.comarticle20,2817,2371036,00.asp;
SSL VPN Security, CISCO SYS., http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/
05_08_SSL-VPN-Security.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
101
See SSL VPN Security, supra note 100.
102
See id.
103
See What Is TLSSSL?, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Mar. 28, 2003), http:technet.
microsoft.comen-uslibrarycc784450(WS.10).aspx.
104
See id.
105
See id. (discussing how HTTPS is the result of layering HTTP with the additional
security capabilities of SSL/TLS).
106
See Web Commerce Hack Attack May ‘Happen Again’, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 18, 2011,
6:17 PM), http:www.bbc.co.uknewstechnology-15348821.
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sometimes not themselves trustworthy.107 Companies like Google
or Facebook implicitly trust these certificate authorities even
though they can lie about users’ identities or be hacked, resulting
in an attacker obtaining false certificates.108 For example, in early
2011, nearly 200 different certificate authorities fulfilled Mozilla
policies and thus could be used to find websites on Firefox,
including the China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC), which is run by the Chinese government.109 In mid2011, fraudulent certificates were obtained from the servers of
Comodo, a popular certificate authority that creates certificates for
the likes of Google mail and Yahoo! Mail, allegedly by an Iranian
hacker.110
These episodes help demonstrate that although
SSL/TLS has been effective in creating valuable channels of trust
on the Internet, this fix cannot compare with IPsec given that SSH
and SSL/TLS operate at the application layer of the IP, whereas
IPsec works below the application layer and secures everything
built on top of the network from the bottom-up. An analogy is
going to each parking lot in the United States and installing an
anti-theft system on every car versus requiring the factory to do so.
Both options have the same effect, but the latter can be far more
efficient.
Nevertheless, IPsec is not a magic bullet. According to Yaron
Sheffer—co-chair of IP Security Maintenance and Extensions at
the IETF—the success of IPsec has been mixed.111 Moreover, new
107

Interview with Chris Palmer, Google Engineer and Former Technology Director,
Electronic Frontiers Foundation, in San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 25, 2011).
108
See, e.g., Danny O’Brien, The Internet’s Secret Back Door, SLATE (Aug. 27, 2010),
http:www.slate.comarticlestechnologywebhead201008the_internets_secret_back_d
oor.html (reporting on the vulnerabilities created by these certificate authorities).
109
Mozilla Included CA Certificate List, MOZILLA, http://www.mozilla.org/projects/
security/certs/included (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
110
See Peter Bright, Another Fraudulent Certificate Raises the Same Old Questions
About Certificate Authorities, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2011), http:arstechnica.com
security2011 08earlier-this-year-an-iranian. However, several firms, including Google,
Microsoft, and Mozilla, have more recently taken some steps in clamping down on
fraudulent certificate authorities. See Ms. Smith, Chrome, Firefox, IE to Block
Fraudulent Digital Certificate, NETWORKWORLD (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.
networkworld.com/community/blog/chrome-firefox-ie-block-fraudulent-digitalcertificate.
111
See Sheffer, supra note 96.
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standards, such as those involving deep packet inspection, could
also undermine the viability of IPsec as a security tool.112 Those in
favor of more endpoint-based security might argue that resources
would be better spent on implementing HTTPS and other
application-level improvements to IP. However, this could still be
a second-best solution to a bottom-up fix such as IPsec, although
opinions are mixed. The roll out of IPv6 will help speed uptake of
IPsec, but more must be done to incentivize and enhance IPsec as
well as application-level security technologies to better manage
vulnerabilities. IPv6, for example, boasts strong encryption, but
also makes it easier for third parties to use traffic analysis to
determine “who is communicating with whom.”113 Although
online communities and standards bodies such as the IETF play an
important role in developing technical fixes for vulnerabilities,
speeding uptake requires market-based incentives and potentially
regulation.114
2. DNSSEC
Like IPsec, DNSSEC is complex, and opinions about its
importance and effectiveness vary. By the early 2000s, it became
clear that DNSSEC would not scale for large networks like the
Internet. Then in 2005, IETF updated the DNSSEC protocol and
Sweden became the first country-code top-level domain (TLD) to
deploy it.115 However, like IPsec, no organization mandated that
DNSSEC be implemented, and few large domain name registries
did so. Privacy concerns arose along with a lack of confidence in
DNSSEC generally.116 As Paul Vixie, president of Internet
112

See Juha Saarinen, ITU Sparks Internet Privacy Fears, IT NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.itnews.com.au/News/325490,itu-sparks-internet-privacy-fears.aspx (reporting
that “[e]ncrypted, compressed and transcoded data can . . . [be] identified by the [ITU]
standard, including IPsec traffic . . . .”).
113
KENNETH GEERS, NATO CCDCOE, STRATEGIC CYBER SECURITY 91 (2011).
114
For a discussion of the shape of such regulation, see Shackelford, supra note 22.
115
See R. Arends et al., Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions, IETF
RFC 4035 (2005), available at http:www.ietf.orgrfcrfc4035.txt; DNSSEC – The Path
to a Secure Domain, INT’L INFRASTRUCTURE FOUNDATION, https://www.iis.se/english/
domains/tech/dnssec (last visited June 12, 2013).
116
See DNSSEC Privacy Policy Statement, DNSSEC.NET, http:www.dnssec.netpp (last
visited Jan. 15, 2014).
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Systems Consortium, wrote in 2008, “[i]t’s been thirteen years
since the first DNSSEC mailing list was set up and about four
times in those thirteen years IETF has declared victory only to
discover that the stuff didn’t work well outside the lab.”117 Classic
collective action problems have also emerged that slowed
deployment because DNSSEC works best if it is supported
throughout the DNS hierarchy as well as the application layer.118
Confusion about deploying DNSSEC at the root added another
disincentive.
Kaminsky’s bug discovery wrenched DNSSEC out of its
malaise. Upon learning about the vulnerability from Kaminsky,
Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Sun Microsystems, and BIND
coordinated efforts and simultaneously released a security patch in
July 2008.119 The patch did not fix the problem overnight, but it
did begin the process of effectively addressing the problem.
However, progress remains slow on DNSSEC writ large. Pre-2008
implementation problems have not disappeared, and adoption of
DNSSEC remains imperfect. It was deployed in the root zone in
July 2010 and has now been implemented in the dot-gov, dot-net,
dot-edu, dot-org, and dot-com domains.120 Yet few organizations
have deployed DNSSEC,121 which is in part because of the fact
that industry is not used to investing resources in the DNS. In the
past, it had been considered a “highly resilient” system.122
DNSSEC adds complexity and costs, at least at the outset.
Moreover, not all security professionals have confidence that
117

Paul Vixie, Why You Should Deploy DNSSEC, DNSSEC (Aug. 2008),
http:www.dnssec.netwhy-deploy-dnssec.
118
See Rod Rasmussen, Application Layers – The DNSSEC Chicken and Egg
Challenge, SEC. WK. (Dec. 20, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comapplication-layersdnssec-chicken-and-egg-challenge.
119
See Ellen Messmer, Major DNS Flaw Could Disrupt the Internet, NETWORK WORLD
(July 8, 2008), http:www.networkworld.comnews2008070808-dns-flaw-disruptsinternet.html.
120
See ROOT DNSSEC, http://www.root-dnssec.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
121
See Carolyn D. Marsan, 5 Years After Major DNS Flaw Is Discovered, Few US
Companies Have Deployed Long-Term Fix, NETWORK WORLD (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/012913-dnssec-266197.html (reporting that
“DNSSEC adoption [has] stall[ed] outside of [the] federal government”).
122
Roland van Rijswijk, DNSSEC: Checking If DNS Points in the Right Direction,
DNSSEC.NET (Jan. 2010), http:www.dnssec.netwhy-deploy-dnssec.
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DNSSEC will solve DNS problems without creating new issues;123
at best, it would fix a narrow problem around which attackers can
navigate. And there is yet another collective action problem to
consider. If ISPs and similar infrastructure players adopt DNSSEC
but others do not and DNS requests stop resolving, end users may
get frustrated and take their business elsewhere.124
Thus,
uncertainty abounds—both about the quality of DNSSEC itself and
the feasibility of deploying it at all levels absent regulatory
intervention.
3. Fixing TCP and BGP
In contrast to the confusion surrounding security for IP and
DNS, security for TCP and BGP remains somewhat ad hoc. For
TCP, some effective countermeasures have been developed,
although there are trade-offs. For example, IP packet filtering
disallows IP address spoofing and serves as a counter to SYN
floods, but universal deployment is unlikely.125 Alternatively,
SYN cache and SYN cookies have been described as among the
best ways to defend against SYN floods,126 but these methods may
undermine broader network performance.127 For BGP, however,
there are few effective solutions. Several alternative BGP
protocols have been proposed, but it has not yet been resolved
which, if any, of these protocols should be adopted.128 However,
like SSL/TLS for IP or bailiwick checking for DNS, filtering may
thwart some eavesdroppers by allowing “only authorized peers to
123

See Ron Altchison, The Case Against DNSSEC, CIRCLEID (Aug. 14, 2007),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/070814_case_against_dnssec.
124
See Why Not Convergence?, IMPERIAL VIOLET (Sept. 7, 2011), http://
www.imperialviolet.org/2011/09/07/convergence.html; DNSSEC, http://epic.org/privacy/
dnssec (last visited June 12, 2013).
125
See Rod Rasmussen, The Implementation Challenges for DNSSEC, SEC. WK. (Nov.
24, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comimplementation-challenges-dnssec; Eddy, supra
note 63 (predicting that “global deployment of filters is neither guaranteed nor likely”).
126
See Wesley M. Eddy, Defenses Against TCP SYN Flooding Attacks, 9 INTERNET
PROTOCOL J. (Dec. 2006), available at http:www.cisco.comwebaboutac123ac147
archived_issuesipj9-4syn_flooding_attacks.html.
127
See id.; TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions, IETF, https:datatracker.ietf.org
wgtcpmcharter (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); Eddy, supra note 63.
128
See Stephen Kent et al., Secure Border Gateway Protocol, 18 IEEE J. SELECTED
AREAS COMM. 582, 582 (2000).
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draw traffic from their routers, and is only for specific IP
prefixes.”129 Unfortunately, though, filtering can be inefficient and
only effective if every ISP participates, underscoring another
collective action problem potentially amenable to polycentric
regulation. A more systemic approach to addressing BGP
vulnerabilities has been developed by Stephen Kent, chief scientist
for information security at BBN Technologies, but the scheme
would only authenticate the “first hop” in a BGP route.130
IPsec and DNSSEC demonstrate that fixes to key Internet
protocols are being developed, and adoption of endpoint-based
solutions such as HTTPS and VPNs is increasing. However,
overall progress has been slow considering that many of these
vulnerabilities were identified in the mid-1990s. There is little
consensus about which solutions are best and how to incentivize
implementation. For example, can security extensions to key
protocols even be effective?
Are endpoint-based solutions
preferable, and if so, how can we be sure that end users will adopt
them? Is there a role for law here, and what are the regulatory,
economic, and political implications?
The Internet’s architecture contributes to its insecurity, which
presents complex challenges for stakeholders including engineers,
governments, businesses, and users. Every day, the Internet
delivers DNS responses that are not reliably authenticated and
sends unverified IP packets between hosts and through routers that
are running on trust, which is sometimes misplaced. For example,
although bank ATMs, air traffic control systems, and electrical
grids can run on private networks, many systems still send
information via the public Internet, even if they are protected by
VPNs and HTTPS, which can introduce new vulnerabilities.131
Cyber peace requires addressing these technical vulnerabilities and
incentivizing the adoption of solutions from the bottom-up once
129

Zetter, supra note 88.
See id.
131
See Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network, INFO. WARFARE
MONITOR 18 (Mar. 29, 2009), available at http:www.scribd.comdoc13731776
Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network [hereinafter Tracking
Ghostnet]; Rose Tsang, Cyber-threats, Vulnerabilities and Attacks on SCADA Networks
13 (Goldman School, Univ. of Cal. Working Paper, 2009).
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scientific consensus is achieved, such as incentives to support the
uptake of IPsec, DNSSEC, and IP packet filtering, as well as the
creation of a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant competition
to research alternatives to the BGP.132 The main barriers to doing
so include the cost of implementing DNSSEC and IPsec, and
uncertainty about whether these and other fixes are effective or
will simply shift the locus of the problem. This may be compared
to the Montreal Protocol, which is an international environmental
treaty designed to address the ozone hole in which the science
linking CFCs to the ozone hole was clear and a relatively small
subset of industry was affected, as opposed to the UNFCCC
climate-change negotiations.133
As with the ozone hole,
Kaminsky’s bug showed a common problem to which there was an
available solution in the form of security patches and DNSSEC.
The differences here lie in the greater number and diversity of
stakeholders required to take action—making that aspect more
similar to the UNFCCC process—as well as continuing scientific
uncertainty. Until these issues are overcome, targeted measures
should be taken even if they do not solve all protocol
vulnerabilities. The extension of DNSSEC to the root and TLDs is
an example of successful public-private polycentric governance in
which the U.S. government, IETF, and private firms came together
to address a common problem and in so doing, enhanced the public
good of cybersecurity. Such partnerships should be broadened and
strengthened, but securing the logical infrastructure is just the
second layer of vulnerability requiring attention. Cyber peace also
requires improving the code that uses these networking protocols.
D. Debugging and Regulating Through Code
Architectural vulnerabilities of the Internet lay the groundwork
for explaining the cyber threat, but there is more to it than that. If
everything built on top of the Internet was secure or if all users
behaved with perfect insight into cyber risks, the threats posed by
132

See KNAKE, supra note 56, at 26–27 (calling for the creation of such a program).
See Daniel Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 29–35 (Urs Luterbacher
& Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001).
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the Internet’s protocols might be contained. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. Users rarely excel at security assessment. Similarly,
what is built on top of the Internet, including operating systems
and applications, is far from ironclad. This substantiates a third
fundamental vulnerability; code.
A programming error is but a recent incarnation of a
vulnerability that is even older than Internet protocols. It is an
error in craftsmanship, like a poorly secured board that would
never have been discovered but for a tornado. In this case,
however, the crafters of software are laying lines of code rather
than framing a house, and hackers are the storm. As has been
described by Professor Lessig, “code is law,” but even though code
has such a vital role to play in Internet governance, it is written and
tested by fallible human beings who make errors, creating
“bugs.”134 Back in 1949, Maurice Wilkes, a British computer
scientist, wrote:
As soon as we started programming, we found to
our surprise that it wasn’t as easy to get programs
right as we had thought. Debugging had to be
discovered. I can remember the exact instant when I
realized that a large part of my life from then on
was going to be spent in finding mistakes in my
own programs.135
Debugging is not an easy process, mostly because programs
often run adequately with bugs—just as a house does not often
collapse because of a few loose nails. Moreover, bugs are
seemingly endless. A popular programming song jokes:
99 little bugs in the code,
99 little bugs in the code,
Fix one bug, compile it again,
101 little bugs in the code.136
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Code, then, is subject to human error as well as malicious
intent because some programmers may purposefully insert bugs so
that they can reenter the code later. Either way, sophisticated
hackers may also exploit these bugs. And this problem may get
worse before it gets better. As programs grow increasingly
complex, more lines of code are often used to get the job done.
Microsoft’s Windows 95 had 10 million lines of code; Windows
XP has approximately 40 million.137 More lines of code mean
more opportunities to make mistakes and more targets to defend
against attackers. As was described by Clarke and Knake in Cyber
War, “even experts cannot usually identify coding errors or
intentional vulnerabilities in a few lines of code, let alone in
millions.”138
Targets abound because code underlies everything, meaning
that attackers can shift their focus as some systems improve or
others gain popularity. For example, whereas operating system
vulnerabilities are reportedly declining, application vulnerabilities
are increasing.139 More hackers are also targeting Apple products
as they gain market share. In October 2010, Apple reported that
there are approximately “5,000 ‘strains’ of malware that target the
Mac and . . . that [some] 500 new Mac-specific samples [are]
appearing every month.”140 In 2012, a single Trojan virus infected
more than 550,000 Apple computers.141 In addition, because
developers like Microsoft and Apple are often unaware of coding
mistakes when they release new products, bugs can go
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undiscovered for some time.142 This gives attackers time to find
and exploit bugs and to damage strategically important targets.
According to Professor Murray, leveraging control of the
Internet’s physical infrastructure could lead the market to “route
around this anomaly in the same way the network routes around
Instead, he advocates for designing
damaged nodes.”143
interventions to manage vulnerabilities in the logical
infrastructure,144 which in turn shapes the regulatory environment
of cyberspace. Indeed, the reliance on basically “a single protocol”
makes regulating through code an appealing proposition.145 For
example, code design could be regulated to include enhanced
privacy, data management,146 and cybersecurity. But code-based
cybersecurity solutions face at least two problems: (1) code-based
controls would have to be leveraged into the carrier layer of the
logical infrastructure, and (2) the carrier layer is founded on
TCP/IP, which “was designed as an end-to-end protocol” lacking
intelligence.147 In other words, code is only as secure as the
underlying systems on which it is running, which as has been
discussed are far from robust. Nevertheless, this underscores the
importance of standards-setting bodies “with the ability to leverage
comprehensive code-based controls . . . [namely] technical
‘consortia of interested persons and companies’”148 such as the
IETF. The question then becomes how best to encourage the
uptake of cybersecurity best practices published by these bodies as
consensus emerges while also addressing underlying
vulnerabilities, which will be discussed.
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Like the Internet protocols, programming flaws are spread
throughout the system, permeating hardware and software and
often bringing to light vulnerabilities at the application layer. Yet
the fourth and final major vulnerability discussed in this section—
social platforms—represents an even wider and more dispersed
problem: you and me. The phrase “social engineering” describes a
method that takes advantage of the fact that, ultimately, it is
humans who run software on hardware on networks, and it is we
who are often considered to be the most insecure link in an
insecure system.
E. The Threat of Social Engineering to the Content Layer
Social engineering is merely one type of threat facing the
content layer, but this variety of cyber attacks are increasingly
popular and most often occurs when an attacker sends a user a
malware-infected e-mail or message that is uniquely targeted to an
individual or organization.149 It is merely an updated version of an
age-old scam that manipulates people into divulging sensitive
information, but those updates make it cutting edge. Today,
attackers often do their homework before attempting a scam. They
can search your cache to see which websites you have visited. Or
they might be able to access your Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn
accounts where they can learn about your friends, interests, and
professional networks to tailor attacks.150
Social engineering began as “phishing” e-mails, which were
sent out en masse, but early phishing e-mails were relatively easy
to spot. Most people knew not to click on a link in an e-mail
purportedly from “Bank of America” when, for example, the red
and blue flag image looked disjointed. More recently, though,
149
See Angela Hennessy, This Social Engineer ‘Hacks’ People to Infiltrate MultiMillion Dollar Companies, VICE, July 10, 2013, http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/wespoke-to-a-social-engineer-about-how-he-hacks-people-and-infiltrates-secure-companies.
150
See, e.g., Michael Cobb, Heading off Advanced Social Engineering Attacks, DARK
READING (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability/heading-offadvanced-social-engineering/240150975 (describing the development of social
engineering attacks); Stacy Cowley, LinkedIn Is a Hacker’s Dream Tool, CNN MONEY
(Mar. 12, 2012, 5:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/12/technology/linkedinhackers/index.htm (reporting on the desirability of using LinkedIn as a hacking tool).
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phishing e-mails have become more sophisticated and
For example, “spear phishing” is becoming
successful.151
increasingly common, which involves sending targeted messages
of the kind that even fooled Google employees in 2009 during
what came to be known as Operation Aurora.152 “Whaling”
messages are sent to the “big fish” of an organization (apologies to
biological taxonomists).153 According to The Economist, “[t]he
amount of information now available online about individuals
makes it ever easier to attack a computer by crafting a personalized
e-mail that is more likely to be trusted and opened.”154 In other
words, if an attacker can learn that you are a 35-year-old male
from Indiana who works at a pharmaceutical company, are friends
with Tom, and likes science fiction, then it is far easier to craft a
message that you would open. And, typically, it is possible to get
far more information than that through a public records search.
Attached to either sort of message may be a link to a malicious
website to open, or file to download. Such messages will often
purportedly be from someone you know or an organization with
which you do business. This tactic capitalizes on the inherent trust
in your relationships. And it works.
A study conducted at Indiana University documents the
usefulness of social media in social engineering. As Professor
Fred Cate, a distinguished professor at Indiana University Maurer
School of Law and director of the Center for Applied
Cybersecurity Research, wrote in comments submitted to the
White House, “the percentage of recipients of a phishing message
persuaded to provide their account name and password increased
from 16 to 72 percent when researchers made it appear that the
fraudulent message originated from a Facebook friend.”155 Such
151
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an instance may create a spiraling problem, as many people reuse
passwords for their social platforms, personal or work email, and
bank accounts. In fact, a study done by Internet security company
Bitdefender in 2010 found that 75 percent of users had “one
common password for social networking and accessing their
email.”156 Additionally, because there is growing evidence of
wrongdoers collaborating, one attacker’s Facebook profile hacking
may be another’s ticket to committing crime or espionage.
Imagine, for example, that you have been emailing your boss about
where to open a new bank account, and an attacker inserts an
account into the thread and tells you to transfer the money into it.
Most often you would probably confirm the change with your
boss, but if it is five o’clock on a Friday, you might just do it. And
you would not be alone. A version of this sort of hack happened to
Lockheed Martin employees.157 The U.S.-based defense contractor
designs and builds sophisticated jet fighters for the U.S. military;
the jets’ blueprints include more than 7.5 million lines of code and
intricate hardware designs.158 Attackers after this information
might once have spent significant time and resources attempting to
crack encryption, and break down firewalls. But instead, this time
they tried social engineering, and it reportedly worked. Emails
purportedly sent by Chinese hackers were crafted to look like they
were being sent from the Pentagon. They requested blueprints for
the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter, and Lockheed Martin
employees obliged.159
156
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At this point, you may be thinking it probably takes
sophistication to conduct these sorts of attacks, and sophistication
is rare. True, but sophistication can go on sale. In recent years,
attackers have been able to buy kits that support social engineering
attacks online. According to one report, in the first six months of
2007, forty-two percent of all phishing messages originated from
three toolkits sold on the web.160 To some researchers, including
those who investigated GhostNet, the widespread use of social
engineering tactics and the availability of tools for executing such
attacks are equally concerning and help explain the rise in
cybercrime and espionage.161
F. Summary
This Part on physical, logical, and content vulnerabilities has
demonstrated how every layer of cyberspace is insecure. Because
of IP, TCP, DNS, and BGP protocol vulnerabilities, the Internet
itself is vulnerable. Bugs in hardware and software make systems
running on the Internet exploitable. And humans who use the
hardware and software can make a bad situation worse. Even if all
the bugs were fixed and protocols were secured, according to
Johnny Long, co-author of No Tech Hacking, there is always going
to be a human somewhere who “holds the keys to the kingdom”
and may be scammed or bribed into giving them up.162 Cyber
peace requires then not only technical innovation to counter the
growing number of cyber weapons and their proliferation, but also
education and better management practices to help mitigate insider
threats. Although technical fixes in the form of IPsec, DNSSEC,
and anti-social engineering campaigns are not panacea cures for
these vulnerabilities, they do represent targeted measures
developed by consortia that can be implemented from the bottomup. We now turn to discussing how this may be conceptualized
within a polycentric framework.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE CYBER THREAT ECOSYSTEM WITHIN A
POLYCENTRIC FRAMEWORK
This final Part begins by discussing some of the cyber threats
that are taking advantage of the technical vulnerabilities discussed
in Part II, before pivoting to analyze how they may be better
addressed through the application of polycentric principles.
A. From the Foothills of the Himalayas to the Frontiers of
Cyberspace: Introducing the Cyber Threat Ecosystem
Botnets and other cyber weapons are readily accessible as
online toolkits and are relatively inexpensive. Coupled with the
facts that the Internet is global, access is widespread, and the
benefits to attackers are concentrated while costs are diffused, a
worrying scenario unfolds. As Scott Charney, Microsoft’s vice
president for trustworthy computing, wrote of the cyber threat in
2009, “[t]here are many malicious actors [including criminals,
terrorists, and states] . . . . Indeed, the Internet is a great place to
commit crime because it provides global connectivity, anonymity,
lack of traceability, and rich targets.”163 According to a 2009
Trend Micro report, cybercrime kits are now widely available
online, and they are getting cheaper.164 Prices can range from a
few cents up to hundreds of dollars or more for sophisticated
malware.165 According to a 2005 Symantec study, $300 will rent a
150,000-strong botnet.166 Some reports have found that it is even
possible to sign up for a free three-minute botnet trial,167 while
Zeus, the prolific trojan horse previously mentioned, can be
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purchased for as little as $700.168 And it can be freely traded.169
GhostNet researchers report that “[t]oday, pirated cyber-crime kits
circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by
anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.”170 Whereas
Miller says that he needs about $50 million to hack the planet,
according to Haroon Meer, a cybersecurity specialist at Thinkst,
one could put together a team that could break in just about
anywhere, that is, win a battle, if not a war, for a fraction of that
cost.171 This is according to informal surveys conducted by Meer
with his fellow cybersecurity specialists, who self-report a high
success rate at breaking into targeted systems. A total cost of less
than $500,000 to break into nearly any system worries Meer; “It’s
a scary number. That wouldn’t even pay for the annual anti-virus
subscription of a big multinational company.”172
An explosion in both the white and black markets has led to the
increased availability of cyber weapons. For example, software
that allows remote access to or control of a Blackberry is being
sold commercially.173 Similarly, a company that made and sold
spyware had to be taken to court before they would take it off the
market.174 Lines can be difficult to draw since spyware enables
users to send infected attachments, but it can also allow parents to
monitor their children’s web activities.175 In addition, according to
Lewis of CSIS, the turnaround time on exploitative tools from the
NSA to the black market is not long—perhaps “three to eight
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years”—although the evidence relied upon in making this estimate
is “partial and anecdotal.”176
Whether available on the white or black markets, cyber
weapons have evolved quickly to attack social networking
platforms and mobile devices.177 According to one 2011 report,
“[t]he pace of change in this technology is quite dramatic. Only a
few years ago, malware for smartphones and cellular devices was
unheard of.”178
By 2010, however, it was relatively
commonplace.179 In November 2010 alone, for example, a virus
that stole contact information to commit fraud had reportedly hit
more than one million mobile phones in China.180 Such attacks are
concerning not only because they are becoming easier to launch,
but also because they point to criminal organizations getting
involved. As Scott Charney noted, a variety of actors are taking
advantage of these weapons.181 With the help of vulnerable
Internet platforms like mobile phones, according to National White
Collar Crime Center director Donald Brackman, “Internet crime is
evolving in ways we couldn’t have imagined just five years
ago.”182 Monetary interests alone may not be driving this
evolution. Rather, state-sponsored attacks may be partly to blame
because states can combine a hacker’s tricks with “the intelligence
apparatus to reconnoiter a target, the computing power to break
codes and passwords, and the patience to probe a system until it
finds a weakness—usually a fallible human being.”183 Entities
within the private sector are taking note. Google, for example, has
176
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begun posting warnings if its security team believes that a statesponsored attack could compromise users’ accounts.184 The
involvement of states in sponsoring cyber attacks is also altering
the nature of cyber conflict—just as the growing involvement of
states in Internet governance is impacting its trajectory.185
Consider the following example, which contextualizes the use of
social engineering and the emergence of espionage networks.
The attack was first traced from northern India, where Tibet’s
spiritual leader resides. “[T]he private office of the Dalai Lama”
had been targeted and sensitive documentation extracted,
according to GhostNet investigator Greg Walton.186 However,
from that starting point, the investigation expanded. Between 2007
and 2009, Walton and others at the Information Warfare Monitor
(IWM) discovered that more than 1,295 computers “located at
ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations,
news media offices, and NGOs” in 103 countries had been
compromised.187 The resulting report found that roughly seventy
percent of the control servers implicated in the attacks were located
at IP addresses that resolved to China.188 In April 2010, IWM
released a follow-up report entitled Shadows in the Cloud, which
analyzed data systematically stolen from governments, businesses,
academia, and computer networks in the United Nations, India, the
United States, “and several other countries.”189 Investigators of the
184
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so-called Shadow network were able to view documents that cyber
attackers had exfiltrated. Whereas the command and control
structure of Shadow was arguably more intricate than that of
GhostNet, investigators found that all of the core servers that
appeared to be at the center of the network were hosted on domain
names in China.190 Ultimately however, the IWM team wrote:
“Although we are able to piece together circumstantial evidence
that provides the location and possible associations of the
attackers, their actual identities and locations remain illusory. We
[only] catch a glimpse of a shadow of attribution in the
cloud . . . .”191
As is demonstrated by the Shadow example, attribution is
difficult because attackers can mask their identities, dispersing
themselves across platforms and jurisdictions.192 This may be
done because of at least three reasons: the first is conceptual, the
second is technical, and the third is legal. Conceptually, attribution
means different things to different people. To some, it might just
mean identifying an IP address; to others, a state or an
organization; and to others, a human being with a motive.193
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190
Id. at iv.
191
Id. at 2–3.
192
See, e.g., China IP Address Link to South Korea Cyber-Attack, BBC (Mar. 21, 2013,
1:11 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21873017 (reporting on a series of
cyber attacks targeting South Korean firms that have been traced back to China but
potentially originated with North Korean hackers). The same holds true for Mandiant’s
2013 report on China’s cyber espionage activities. See Dan Mcwhorter, Mandiant
Exposes APT1 – One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units & Releases 3,000 Indicators, MUNITION (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.mandiant.com/blog/mandiant-exposes-apt1chinas-cyber-espionage-units-releases-3000-indicators; cf. Jeffrey Carr, Mandiant APT1
Report Has Critical Analytical Flaws, DIGITAL DAO (Feb. 19, 2013), http://jeffreycarr.
blogspot.com/2013/02/mandiant-apt1-report-has-critical.html (arguing that “if you’re
going to make a claim for attribution, then you must be both fair and thorough in your
analysis and, through the application of a scientific method like ACH, rule out competing
hypotheses and then use estimative language in your finding. Mandiant simply did not
succeed” in this regard).
193
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK
CAPABILITIES 138–141 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, & Herbert S. Lin eds.,
2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMIES].

422

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:381

Technically, sophisticated attacks by knowledgeable hackers,
whether private or state sponsored, are difficult to trace definitively
to their source.194 The science of tracing cyber attacks has been
somewhat slow to develop in part because of TCP/IP.195 If an IP
packet can be grabbed or spoofed mid-route, it becomes difficult to
trace it back to where it actually began. Thus, whereas in theory it
is possible to locate the IP address of cyber attackers and use that
information to identify individual hackers, sophisticated attackers
are able to re-route or otherwise confuse programs designed to
locate them. Similarly, if a hacker is using a botnet to carry out
attacks, the process of tracing IP packets becomes much more
involved and time consuming. Can the cyber infrastructure be
modernized to enhance tracing? The short answer is yes, but not
easily or cheaply.
Overhauling protocols once they are
implemented is no simple matter. Some, like Admiral McConnell,
remain adamant that “we need to reengineer the Internet to make
attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis, and impact
assessment . . . more manageable.”196 However, this is unlikely—
at least in the short term—and many people are not convinced that
the architecture should be overhauled because it would mean
limiting anonymity online.197 Compromise may take the form of
encouraging the use of VPNs and focusing on improving security
for certain cyber transactions such as those involving critical
national infrastructure, which could be made more traceable
without ending anonymity as we know it.

194

See id. at 139; HOWARD F. LIPSON, CERT COORDINATION CTR., TRACKING AND
TRACING C YBER-ATTACKS: T ECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES 4–
5 (2002), available at http:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA408853.
195
See LIPSON, supra note 194, at 27; Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber
Attacks Are so Difficult to Trace Back to Hackers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=tracking-cyber-hackers.
196
Mike McConnell, McConnell on How to Win the Cyber-War We’re Losing, WASH.
POST, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/
25/AR2010022502493.html.
197
But see Jonathan Mayer, There’s Anonymity on the Internet. Get Over It., FREEDOM
TO TINKER (Oct. 27, 2009), https:freedom-to-tinker.comblogjrmayertheresanonymity-internet-get-over-it (making the case that anonymity will continue on the
Internet).

2014]

HACKING THE PLANET, THE DALAI LAMA, AND YOU

423

B. Toward a Polycentric Approach to Mitigating Technical
Vulnerabilities
To substantiate discussions of cyber weapons and
vulnerabilities at multiple levels and explore some of the
difficulties inherent in achieving cyber peace, this Part began by
discussing the Shadow cyber espionage campaign.
This
demonstrates how cyber attacks are evolving and suggest that there
are now many malicious actors in cyberspace—including states.
Indeed, since the early 2000s, states have become more interested
in the Internet in terms of governance, as a tool for espionage,198
and as a way to control restive populations. “These days even the
website of China’s Defense Ministry has a section with music
downloads . . . ,” noted Evgeny Morozov.199 However, while
states are an important aspect of the evolving cyber threat, cyber
attacks, like most kinds of threats, are the result of a more complex
ecosystem. Protocols, programming, and people all contribute to
its structure and give form to its vulnerabilities. And as cyberspace
expands, these problems may get worse before they get better.
Every day our digital lives are enhanced, but each new program,
app, or cloud computing service also “creates an opportunity for
this ecosystem to morph, adapt, and exploit” because “these new
technologies [develop] faster than procedures and rules have been
created to deal with the . . . vulnerabilities they introduce.”200
Because of the manner in which Internet governance has evolved,
no single entity has a mandate to enhance security in the system,
198
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and perhaps that is how it should be since if a single entity did
occupy the field, such as the U.S. government or an
intergovernmental organization, it could risk crowding out
innovative bottom-up efforts.201
This Article has shown that vulnerabilities exist at the physical,
logical, and content layers of the Internet’s architecture, and that an
array of cyber weapons are being deployed by attackers with
varying motives to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.
Whether it is problems in IP or DNS, these vulnerabilities are best
managed from the bottom-up through education, market-based
incentives, and, if necessary, regulatory intervention. Such efforts
will benefit from coordination among dispersed power holders; for
example, the extension of DNSSEC to the root and TLDs is an
example of a successful polycentric measure that has improved on
the status quo, even if it has not fully resolved the underlying
problem. Lessons should be taken from protocols, which must fill
a real need, be incrementally deployable, and enjoy open source
availability to be successful.202
In short, instead of waiting for scientific and political
consensus for how best to comprehensively solve the cyber threat,
action should be taken through nested enterprises at multiple levels
taking into account the layering of the Internet’s infrastructure and
Professor Ostrom’s design principles.203 This effort may be
conceptualized as a polycentric undertaking given that it
201
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“encourages experimentation at multiple levels,”204 self-regulation
and bottom-up governance, as well as targeted measures to address
global collective action problems. For example, empowering
communities with defined boundaries of responsibility and
authority recognized by state actors is one component of mitigating
technical vulnerabilities under the “collective-choice arrangements
and minimal recognition of rights” principle.205 However, because
of the limits of regulating exclusively through code and the risk of
regulatory competition,206 as well as the multifaceted nature of
cyber attacks extending beyond technical vulnerabilities, laws,
norms, and markets also have a key role to play in shaping the
regulatory environment and fostering cyber peace. The way
forward, then, involves taking incremental steps to address the
multiple layers and dimensions of this threat ecosystem, focusing
first on the physical and logical infrastructures given that these
layers comprise the foundation of cybersecurity.
Potential
solutions to TCP, IP, DNS, and BGP vulnerabilities such as IPsec,
DNSSEC, and IP packet filtering should be further refined and,
after achieving broader consensus, widely implemented; hardware
and software must be improved, such as through securing supply
chains or creating liability structures; and users must be
incentivized to become better educated and responsible. Even
though managing technical vulnerabilities is just the first step in
the journey to enhancing global cybersecurity, it is a vital one that
deserves more attention by public- and private-sector regulators
seeking out best practices generated organically from the bottomup and codifying them where necessary to help ensure that
fictional accounts such as Miller’s cyber army do not join the ranks
of real life exploits such as Shadow and the Syrian Electronic
Army’s attacks. Technical communities have a central role to play
in shaping this debate as part of a polycentric approach to
mitigating cyber attacks and promoting cyber peace.
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